The floor of the hangar doesn’t just hold the weight of a Global 6000; it vibrates with a specific, low-frequency hum that you only feel in the soles of your boots if you’ve stood there for a decade. It’s a rhythmic, industrial pulse-the sound of a tug engine coughing to life, the whine of a GPU, the distant metallic clatter of a tool dropped in the maintenance bay. For Denise, the general manager of this FBO for the last , that vibration is a language. She can tell by the pitch of the hangar door’s motor if the rollers are starting to seize. She knows, without looking at the tail number, which tenant is returning early because of the way the pilot throttles back on the taxiway.
Right now, however, the vibration she feels is a jittery, high-strung frequency coming from the three people sitting across from her in her cramped, second-story office. They are wearing identical navy-blue fleece vests over crisp button-downs. They have the look of people who spend their lives in climate-controlled offices but want to appear “operational” for the afternoon. They called this an “operations review.” Denise knows better. She’s seen the way they looked at the fuel farm on the way in-not at the filters or the sumps, but at the meter, like they were trying to count the dollars flowing through the nozzles.
The Meeting of Two Realities
Halfway through the meeting, the lead vest-a man named Marcus who hasn’t stopped clicking his pen-asks about the largest based tenant.
“We see the lease for the Part 135 operator expires in ,” – Marcus
says Marcus, eyes fixed on a tablet. “Everything seems stable there, right? No reason to expect a departure?”
Denise pauses. The air in the office smells of stale coffee and the faint, ubiquitous scent of Jet-A that clings to everything in this building. She knows that the Part 135 operator is currently in a screaming match with the airport authority over ramp access. She knows their lead pilot is looking at moving the fleet to the regional airport twenty miles north because the fuel prices there are eighteen cents lower. She knows the owner of that company hasn’t spoken to the FBO’s current owner in .
But Denise also knows that these three men represent a potential new owner. She doesn’t know if her job exists under their regime. She doesn’t know if they value her twelve years of “vibration-reading” or if they just want a cheaper body in her chair. If she tells them the truth-that the largest tenant is a flight risk-the “deal” might change. If the deal changes, her current boss, who is counting on this exit to fund his retirement in Scottsdale, will be furious.
“Everything is going well,” she says. Her voice is steady, but she feels the lie in her throat like a piece of dry toast. “They’re a great tenant.”
The fleece vests nod. They check a box. The price remains the price. And a $15.4 million transaction continues to barrel toward a closing date based on a reality that doesn’t actually exist.
I spent years believing that the P&L was the supreme arbiter of truth. I was wrong. I used to sit in rooms exactly like the one Denise is in, thinking that if I could just get the “adjusted EBITDA” right, I had captured the essence of the business. I thought that if the fuel margins were $0.62 over the last three years, they would be $0.62 for the next three. I treated the general manager as a “risk to be managed”-someone to be kept in the dark to prevent a staff exodus, or someone to be interviewed at the very last minute just to confirm the location of the emergency shut-off valves.
I was wrong because I was ignoring the structural information loss that happens when you exclude the operator from the valuation phase. We treat the general manager as a cost center or a liability, when in reality, they are the only person holding the keys to the future earnings of the asset. The M&A process is designed to keep them outside the room until the price is mostly set, and by the time they are invited in, they are too terrified for their livelihoods to tell you anything that might jeopardize the deal.
It reminds me of last night, at , when my smoke detector decided to inform me that its battery was at 14% capacity. It wasn’t a fire. It was just a beep-a piercing, rhythmic insolence that demanded I drag a ladder out of the garage in my boxers. In that moment, I didn’t care about the safety of my home; I just wanted the noise to stop so I could get back to the dream I was having.
M&A deals are often like that. The buyers want the “noise” of operational reality to stop so they can get back to the “dream” of the pro forma. They see the general manager’s hesitation as an annoyance, a battery that needs replacing, rather than a signal that the house is actually on fire.
When the GM stays silent, the buyer pays a premium for ignorance.
Testing the Operating Assumptions
In the world of FBO acquisitions, the “seller’s narrative” is a polished, sanded-down version of the truth. It’s a story where the fuel volume dip last spring was “seasonal variance” rather than “the local flight school realized we were overcharging them and moved their business.” It’s a story where the $200,000 in add-backs for “owner’s personal travel” are legitimate adjustments, even if the owner was actually using that travel to scout for a new business to replace the one he’s selling.
When an acquirer brings in a firm like
the goal is to break that narrative before it becomes a binding LOI. You have to test the operating assumptions behind the figures. You have to look at the hangar economics and realize that while occupancy is 98%, the leasehold terms are such that the FBO is essentially subsidizing the storage of three vintage Cessnas that haven’t moved in five years and never buy a drop of fuel.
The general manager knows these stories. They know which tenants pay on time and which ones require a phone call every Tuesday. They know that the pavement on Taxiway Bravo is starting to spall and will require a $450,000 repair that isn’t in the CapEx budget. They know that the competing FBO on the other side of the field just hired a new director of sales who is aggressively poaching corporate accounts.
But why would they tell you?
The Survival Lens
Consider the psychological state of a GM during a sale. They are often the last to know and the first to be blamed. They are told to “keep things quiet” to avoid “spooking the employees,” which is corporate-speak for “we don’t want the good people to leave before we get our check.” They are treated as a temporary custodian of someone else’s wealth.
When the buyers show up, the GM is looking at them through a lens of survival. Every question from the buyer is a potential trap. If the GM is too honest about the risks, they might kill the deal and lose their job. If they are too rosy, they might be seen as incompetent when the risks manifest after the close. The result is a filtered, sanitized version of reality that leads to massive overpayment.
This is where the transition plan becomes more than just a HR document. It becomes a valuation tool. If you approach the GM not as a “resource to be interviewed,” but as a partner in the future success of the site, the information starts to flow. But that requires a level of transparency that most M&A attorneys find nauseating. It requires saying, “We are looking at buying this business, we think you are the key to its success, and we want to know what we are actually stepping into.”
I’ve seen deals where the “management meeting” lasted . Forty-five minutes to download a decade of operational nuance. It’s absurd. It’s like trying to learn how to fly a plane by reading the “About the Author” section of the pilot’s manual. You might know his name and where he went to school, but you have no idea what to do when the left engine starts coughing at 12,000 feet.
The real value of an FBO isn’t in the tanks or the hangars. It’s in the relationships and the “vibrations” that the GM manages every day. When a buyer ignores that, they aren’t just taking a risk; they are paying a premium for their own ignorance. They are buying the “dream” and ignoring the smoke detector.
Moving Beyond the Checklist
We need to stop treating the “management interview” as a box to be checked during the last week of diligence. It needs to be the foundation. We need to look at the fuel margins not as a static number, but as a result of a hundred small negotiations that the GM has won or lost. We need to understand the leasehold risk not just from the legal document, but from the GM’s relationship with the airport manager.
If you don’t have the GM on your side, you don’t actually own the business; you just own the title to the buildings. The business remains in the head of the person who knows why the tug engine is coughing.
Denise sits in her office after the fleece vests have left. She looks at the picture of her kids on her desk and the stack of fuel slips that need to be processed. She feels a profound sense of loneliness. She has the information that would save those men $2 million in overpayment, but she has no reason to give it to them.
She’ll wait. She’ll watch. And when the deal closes and the new owners realize the Part 135 operator is gone, they’ll wonder why no one told them. They’ll blame the seller. They’ll blame the market. They might even blame Denise. But the fault lies in the process itself-a process that values the secrecy of the deal over the reality of the hangar floor.